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New thinking on old tech for a secure future |
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September 19, 2016 |
By Senators James E. Risch and Angus S. King
In the 2015 novel Ghost Fleet, the U.S.
is challenged in a future war by a
technologically savvy enemy. The enemy exploits
the cyber vulnerabilities in a U.S. military
that has grown overly reliant on highly
networked and computer-dependent weapons
platforms. Left nearly defenseless, the U.S.
comes to realize it must rely on long-retired,
technologically simpler and ultimately more
dependable weapon systems to fight back.
Although P.W. Singer and August Cole’s story is
fiction, the potential threats described are
cause for real concern. And the military is not
the only sector that might make an attractive
target. In fact, our most critical energy
systems in the U.S. are connected through
complex digital technologies as well.
Increasingly automated and complex control
systems are essential to the infrastructure that
provides everything from the basic necessities
of modern life, including communication,
navigation, and manufacturing, to critical
functions of national security. Protecting these
systems is one of our most pressing security
challenges.
In short, while the rapid, worldwide adoption of
digital automation technologies has created many
benefits, it has also introduced significant
cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure
that must be addressed.
To that end, we recently introduced bipartisan
legislation along with Senators Susan Collins
and Martin Heinrich to safeguard the U.S. from
these potentially catastrophic threats. The
Securing Energy Infrastructure Act would launch
a coordinated effort to help protect U.S.
infrastructure from the vulnerabilities inherent
in a connected and highly interdependent world.
In doing so, it seeks to identify better ways to
protect the country’s critical control systems –
those systems that support some of the most
important energy sector processes.
As members of both the Intelligence and Energy
committees, a principal goal of the pilot
program established by our bill is to identify
ways to reduce some of the digital complexity in
our critical infrastructure, thereby limiting
opportunities for cyber-attacks and improving
our ability to defend those systems.
For example, by replacing certain portions of
digital and technologically advanced operating
systems that are vulnerable to exploitation with
far simpler analog devices or manual processes
and procedures, we can hinder sophisticated
cyber-enemies. This will require that our nation
shift from simple applications of complex
technologies to applying new thinking on simple,
but more secure and robust solutions.
One of the benefits of less dependence on
automation and digital technology in critical
infrastructure was revealed in a December 2015
cyber-attack against Ukraine’s power grid. The
sophisticated cyber-attack left more than
225,000 people without power for several hours.
Subsequent investigations suggest Ukraine was
saved from a much greater impact by operating
its grid in manual modes when digital systems
could not be trusted.
We are proud that the solutions to many of these
security challenges are being developed at our
National Laboratories, including the Idaho
National Laboratory (INL). Our National Labs are
unique assets and their expertise will help
drive the innovations this legislation aims to
achieve. By encouraging this research, we are
working to ensure the U.S. never faces a day
when our reliance on highly networked technology
leaves us vulnerable to attack.
While Ghost Fleet may be a thrilling
novel, its lesson rings true; the U.S. must be
prepared to defend ourselves -- and our most
critical infrastructure -- from attacks by our
increasingly sophisticated, technologically
advanced, adversaries. |
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